

eXpressive Internet Architecture: Overview and Next Phase

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
Outline

- XIA overview
 - Architecture review
 - Prototype
 - Research activities
- Research nuggets
- Next phase direction

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“Narrow Waist” of the Internet Key to its Success

- Has allowed Internet to evolve dramatically
- But now an obstacle to addressing challenges:
 - No built-in security
 - New usage models a challenge – content and services, not hosts
 - Hard to leverage advances in technology in network
 - Limited interactions between network edge and core
- But where do we get started?



Three Simple Ideas

- Support multiple types of destinations
 - Not only hosts, but also content, services, etc.
 - Network can adapt over time - reduces complexity and overhead at higher layers
- Flexible addressing gives the network multiple options for completing a communication operation
 - Includes both an “intent” and “fallback” address
 - Supports evolvability, in-network error recovery, network diversity, mobility, ...
- Intrinsic security guarantees security properties as a direct result of the design of the system
 - Do not rely on external configurations, data bases, ...
 - Network level management of addresses

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

Multiple Principal Types

- Hosts XIDs support host-based communication similar to IP – *who?*
- Service XIDs allow the network to route to possibly replicated services – *what does it do?*
 - LAN services access, WAN replication, ...
- Content XIDs allow network to retrieve content from “anywhere” – *what is it?*
 - Opportunistic caches, CDNs, ...
- Autonomous domains allow scoping, hierarchy
- Set of principal types can evolve over time

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Flexible Addressing

- Combining intent and fallback address offers flexibility for network in completing request
 - Set of principal types can evolve
 - Also supports scoping
 - Implemented as DAGs




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Intrinsic Security in XIA




- XIA uses self-certifying identifiers that guarantee security properties for communication operation
 - Host ID is a hash of its public key – accountability (AIP)
 - Content ID is a hash of the content – correctness
 - Does not rely on external configurations
- Useful for bootstrapping e-e security solutions
- Intrinsic security is specific to the principal type:
 - Content XID: content is correct
 - Service XID: the right service provided content
 - Host XID: content was delivered from right host

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XIA: An Example



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- ### Ongoing Networking Research
- Transport protocols: congestion control, error recovery
 - Intrinsic security and mobility, ...
 - Incremental deployment of network architectures (features)
 - Verification of third party services using TPMs
 - Very fast lookup of flat IDs in huge tables
 - Optimize use of network features under user control
 - Native Unix XIA implementation; extensibility
 - Design of a network control plane
 - Routing and forwarding for services, content
 - Network diagnostics, centralized versus distributed control
 - Video streaming as a use case for XIA
 - Economic incentives and implications of cryptographic identifiers
 - Balancing user accountability and privacy

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- XIA overview
- Research nuggets
 - Architecture
 - Controlling paths
 - Evolvability everywhere
 - Users and providers
- Next phase directions

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
Architecture Nuggets

Examples of how XIA features can help address various network challenges

- Evolvability
- Mobility
- Incremental deployment
- Accountability versus privacy
- eXtreme evolvability

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4ID in Action: Dealing with Legacy Networks



Works for arbitrary pairs of XIA networks

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Source Addresses, or Balancing Privacy and Accountability

- Source addresses are assumed to be essential but you can build a network without them
- What are source addresses used for?


Hard to balance
Privacy and
Accountability:
Tor versus AIP



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Accountability and Privacy

- View source addresses as accountability addresses
 - “Service” that takes responsibility for packet
 - Accountability can be delegated
 - Return address can be inside packet
 - Uses AIP style accountability
- Many “details”: nature of delegate, faith sharing, ...



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XIA as a Platform of Architectural Exploration

- Evolvability is hard to quantify
- Our approach: port alien designs
 - Push evolvability to the extreme
 - Realize pluralism through inclusiveness
- Recurrent porting questions
 - How to best map Y’s identifiers to XIDs?
 - When can we reuse XID types?
 - How to break Y into principals?
 - Are there interesting alternative interpretations?

How Alien Designs Pushed XIA

- Serval: service-centric architecture
 - multiple classes of identifiers
- NDN: content-centric architecture
 - evolution stress test
- IP: migration/deployment plan
- ANTS: active network
 - Proof/demonstration of generality

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
SCION Architectural Goals

- High availability, even in presence of malicious parties
- Explicit trust for network operations
- Minimal TCB: limit number of entities that need to be trusted for any operation
 - Strong isolation from untrusted parties
- Operate with mutually distrusting entities
 - No single root of trust
- Enable route control for ISPs, receivers, senders
- Simplicity, efficiency, flexibility, and scalability

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Path Selection in SCION Architecture Overview

- Split network in trust domains
- Source/destination can choose from up/down hill paths in TD
- Path control shared between ISPs, receivers, senders
- Desirable security properties:
 - High availability, even in presence of malicious parties
 - Explicit trust for operations
 - Minimal TCB: limit number of entities that must be trusted
 - No single root of trust
 - Simplicity, efficiency, flexibility, and scalability



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Richer Interfaces - Tussle





- How do we control relationship between users, service providers, ISP, etc. – “choice points”:
- Choice of XID type, i.e. how is communication operation performed involving different tradeoffs
 - Choices for both end-points and providers: XIDs to use or support
- DAGs add flexibility: fallback, services, ...
 - Input from destination, sources, and providers
 - Different options for supporting binding, mobility, ...
- Scion offers some control over path selection
 - Can balance control between end-points and providers
 - Opens doors for service differentiation

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Pew Study on Anonymity, Privacy and Security Online



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
Must “Empower” Users

- Having network-level mechanisms to deal with various threats is not sufficient
- How do users know what information is visible to observers inside the network?
 - Tell them!
 - Course project in HCI defined sample interface
- How do users control privacy for individual sessions?
 - Need to have model of what the threat is: source, destination, different points in the end-to-end path

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
When Should ISPs Cache?

- Many FIA proposals support app-independent caching, e.g., CIDs
 - ISP can subsume role of CDNs
- Consider transparent and “for pay” caching
 - Payment requires billing/accountability services
- Eyeball networks have the most to gain



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When is caching viable?



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 - Evaluation of network architectures
 - Network environments
 - Control plane architecture
 - Building and using XIA networks
 - Privacy, anonymity, and accountability


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Control Plane Architecture

- Today's internet does not have a real control plane
 - Ad hoc collection of independently developed control protocols, e.g., BGP, ICMP, ...
- What would an architecture for a internet control plane look like?
 - What functions can be shared across protocols?
 - Can it evolve? Incremental protocol deployment?
 - How do we secure it?
- Use routing for our initial focus
 - More on this later

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
XIA Packet Processing Pipeline



- Principal-independent processing defines how to interpret the DAG
 - Core architecture
- Principal-dependent processing realizes forwarding semantics for each XID type
 - Logically: one forwarding table per XID type
 - Reality: anything goes, e.g., no forwarding table
- Control plane sets up forwarding for each principal type

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Control Plane The 10K Mile View



- Domains present a single point of control at inter-domain level
- Matches logically centralized intra-domain control
 - But actual implementation can be anything

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Building and Using an XIA Network

- Looking at various network challenges and they can be addressed within XIA
 - Internet congestion control
 - Multicast and mobility
- Deploying and managing XIA networks
 - Multihoming, multipath
 - Service discovery, binding and routing
 - Fast XIA
 - Establishing and controlling session

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Questions?

